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The Scientific and Rational Are Not Co

  • 1 Psychoanalysis

       [Psychoanalysis] seeks to prove to the ego that it is not even master in its own house, but must content itself with scanty information of what is going on unconsciously in the mind. (Freud, 1953-1974, Vol. 16, pp. 284-285)
       Although in the interview the analyst is supposedly a "passive" auditor of the "free association" narration by the subject, in point of fact the analyst does direct the course of the narrative. This by itself does not necessarily impair the evidential worth of the outcome, for even in the most meticulously conducted laboratory experiment the experimenter intervenes to obtain the data he is after. There is nevertheless the difficulty that in the nature of the case the full extent of the analyst's intervention is not a matter that is open to public scrutiny, so that by and large one has only his own testimony as to what transpires in the consulting room. It is perhaps unnecessary to say that this is not a question about the personal integrity of psychoanalytic practitioners. The point is the fundamental one that no matter how firmly we may resolve to make explicit our biases, no human being is aware of all of them, and that objectivity in science is achieved through the criticism of publicly accessible material by a community of independent inquirers.... Moreover, unless data are obtained under carefully standardized circumstances, or under different circumstances whose dependence on known variables is nevertheless established, even an extensive collection of data is an unreliable basis for inference. To be sure, analysts apparently do attempt to institute standard conditions for the conduct of interviews. But there is not much information available on the extent to which the standardization is actually enforced, or whether it relates to more than what may be superficial matters. (E. Nagel, 1959, pp. 49-50)
       3) No Necessary Incompatibility between Psychoanalysis and Certain Religious Formulations
       here would seem to be no necessary incompatibility between psychoanalysis and those religious formulations which locate God within the self. One could, indeed, argue that Freud's Id (and even more Groddeck's It), the impersonal force within which is both the core of oneself and yet not oneself, and from which in illness one become[s] alienated, is a secular formation of the insight which makes religious people believe in an immanent God. (Ryecroft, 1966, p. 22)
       Freudian analysts emphasized that their theories were constantly verified by their "clinical observations."... It was precisely this fact-that they always fitted, that they were always confirmed-which in the eyes of their admirers constituted the strongest argument in favour of these theories. It began to dawn on me that this apparent strength was in fact their weakness.... It is easy to obtain confirmations or verifications, for nearly every theory-if we look for confirmation. (Popper, 1968, pp. 3435)
       5) Psychoanalysis Is Not a Science But Rather the Interpretation of a Narrated History
       Psychoanalysis does not satisfy the standards of the sciences of observation, and the "facts" it deals with are not verifiable by multiple, independent observers.... There are no "facts" nor any observation of "facts" in psychoanalysis but rather the interpretation of a narrated history. (Ricoeur, 1974, p. 186)
       6) Some of the Qualities of a Scientific Approach Are Possessed by Psychoanalysis
       In sum: psychoanalysis is not a science, but it shares some of the qualities associated with a scientific approach-the search for truth, understanding, honesty, openness to the import of the observation and evidence, and a skeptical stance toward authority. (Breger, 1981, p. 50)
       [Attributes of Psychoanalysis:]
       1. Psychic Determinism. No item in mental life and in conduct and behavior is "accidental"; it is the outcome of antecedent conditions.
       2. Much mental activity and behavior is purposive or goal-directed in character.
       3. Much of mental activity and behavior, and its determinants, is unconscious in character. 4. The early experience of the individual, as a child, is very potent, and tends to be pre-potent over later experience. (Farrell, 1981, p. 25)
       Our sceptic may be unwise enough... to maintain that, because analytic theory is unscientific on his criterion, it is not worth discussing. This step is unwise, because it presupposes that, if a study is not scientific on his criterion, it is not a rational enterprise... an elementary and egregious mistake. The scientific and the rational are not co-extensive. Scientific work is only one form that rational inquiry can take: there are many others. (Farrell, 1981, p. 46)
       Psychoanalysts have tended to write as though the term analysis spoke for itself, as if the statement "analysis revealed" or "it was analyzed as" preceding a clinical assertion was sufficient to establish the validity of what was being reported. An outsider might easily get the impression from reading the psychoanalytic literature that some standardized, generally accepted procedure existed for both inference and evidence. Instead, exactly the opposite has been true. Clinical material in the hands of one analyst can lead to totally different "findings" in the hands of another. (Peterfreund, 1986, p. 128)
       The analytic process-the means by which we arrive at psychoanalytic understanding-has been largely neglected and is poorly understood, and there has been comparatively little interest in the issues of inference and evidence. Indeed, psychoanalysts as a group have not recognized the importance of being bound by scientific constraints. They do not seem to understand that a possibility is only that-a possibility-and that innumerable ways may exist to explain the same data. Psychoanalysts all too often do not seem to distinguish hypotheses from facts, nor do they seem to understand that hypotheses must be tested in some way, that criteria for evidence must exist, and that any given test for any hypothesis must allow for the full range of substantiation/refutation. (Peterfreund, 1986, p. 129)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Psychoanalysis

  • 2 Philosophy

       And what I believe to be more important here is that I find in myself an infinity of ideas of certain things which cannot be assumed to be pure nothingness, even though they may have perhaps no existence outside of my thought. These things are not figments of my imagination, even though it is within my power to think of them or not to think of them; on the contrary, they have their own true and immutable natures. Thus, for example, when I imagine a triangle, even though there may perhaps be no such figure anywhere in the world outside of my thought, nor ever have been, nevertheless the figure cannot help having a certain determinate nature... or essence, which is immutable and eternal, which I have not invented and which does not in any way depend upon my mind. (Descartes, 1951, p. 61)
       Let us console ourselves for not knowing the possible connections between a spider and the rings of Saturn, and continue to examine what is within our reach. (Voltaire, 1961, p. 144)
       As modern physics started with the Newtonian revolution, so modern philosophy starts with what one might call the Cartesian Catastrophe. The catastrophe consisted in the splitting up of the world into the realms of matter and mind, and the identification of "mind" with conscious thinking. The result of this identification was the shallow rationalism of l'esprit Cartesien, and an impoverishment of psychology which it took three centuries to remedy even in part. (Koestler, 1964, p. 148)
       It has been made of late a reproach against natural philosophy that it has struck out on a path of its own, and has separated itself more and more widely from the other sciences which are united by common philological and historical studies. The opposition has, in fact, been long apparent, and seems to me to have grown up mainly under the influence of the Hegelian philosophy, or, at any rate, to have been brought out into more distinct relief by that philosophy.... The sole object of Kant's "Critical Philosophy" was to test the sources and the authority of our knowledge, and to fix a definite scope and standard for the researches of philosophy, as compared with other sciences.... [But Hegel's] "Philosophy of Identity" was bolder. It started with the hypothesis that not only spiritual phenomena, but even the actual world-nature, that is, and man-were the result of an act of thought on the part of a creative mind, similar, it was supposed, in kind to the human mind.... The philosophers accused the scientific men of narrowness; the scientific men retorted that the philosophers were crazy. And so it came about that men of science began to lay some stress on the banishment of all philosophic influences from their work; while some of them, including men of the greatest acuteness, went so far as to condemn philosophy altogether, not merely as useless, but as mischievous dreaming. Thus, it must be confessed, not only were the illegitimate pretensions of the Hegelian system to subordinate to itself all other studies rejected, but no regard was paid to the rightful claims of philosophy, that is, the criticism of the sources of cognition, and the definition of the functions of the intellect. (Helmholz, quoted in Dampier, 1966, pp. 291-292)
       Philosophy remains true to its classical tradition by renouncing it. (Habermas, 1972, p. 317)
       I have not attempted... to put forward any grand view of the nature of philosophy; nor do I have any such grand view to put forth if I would. It will be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the history of "howlers" and progress in philosophy as the debunking of howlers. It will also be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the enterprise of putting forward a priori truths about the world.... I see philosophy as a field which has certain central questions, for example, the relation between thought and reality.... It seems obvious that in dealing with these questions philosophers have formulated rival research programs, that they have put forward general hypotheses, and that philosophers within each major research program have modified their hypotheses by trial and error, even if they sometimes refuse to admit that that is what they are doing. To that extent philosophy is a "science." To argue about whether philosophy is a science in any more serious sense seems to me to be hardly a useful occupation.... It does not seem to me important to decide whether science is philosophy or philosophy is science as long as one has a conception of both that makes both essential to a responsible view of the world and of man's place in it. (Putnam, 1975, p. xvii)
       What can philosophy contribute to solving the problem of the relation [of] mind to body? Twenty years ago, many English-speaking philosophers would have answered: "Nothing beyond an analysis of the various mental concepts." If we seek knowledge of things, they thought, it is to science that we must turn. Philosophy can only cast light upon our concepts of those things.
       This retreat from things to concepts was not undertaken lightly. Ever since the seventeenth century, the great intellectual fact of our culture has been the incredible expansion of knowledge both in the natural and in the rational sciences (mathematics, logic).
       The success of science created a crisis in philosophy. What was there for philosophy to do? Hume had already perceived the problem in some degree, and so surely did Kant, but it was not until the twentieth century, with the Vienna Circle and with Wittgenstein, that the difficulty began to weigh heavily. Wittgenstein took the view that philosophy could do no more than strive to undo the intellectual knots it itself had tied, so achieving intellectual release, and even a certain illumination, but no knowledge. A little later, and more optimistically, Ryle saw a positive, if reduced role, for philosophy in mapping the "logical geography" of our concepts: how they stood to each other and how they were to be analyzed....
       Since that time, however, philosophers in the "analytic" tradition have swung back from Wittgensteinian and even Rylean pessimism to a more traditional conception of the proper role and tasks of philosophy. Many analytic philosophers now would accept the view that the central task of philosophy is to give an account, or at least play a part in giving an account, of the most general nature of things and of man. (Armstrong, 1990, pp. 37-38)
       8) Philosophy's Evolving Engagement with Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science
       In the beginning, the nature of philosophy's engagement with artificial intelligence and cognitive science was clear enough. The new sciences of the mind were to provide the long-awaited vindication of the most potent dreams of naturalism and materialism. Mind would at last be located firmly within the natural order. We would see in detail how the most perplexing features of the mental realm could be supported by the operations of solely physical laws upon solely physical stuff. Mental causation (the power of, e.g., a belief to cause an action) would emerge as just another species of physical causation. Reasoning would be understood as a kind of automated theorem proving. And the key to both was to be the depiction of the brain as the implementation of multiple higher level programs whose task was to manipulate and transform symbols or representations: inner items with one foot in the physical (they were realized as brain states) and one in the mental (they were bearers of contents, and their physical gymnastics were cleverly designed to respect semantic relationships such as truth preservation). (A. Clark, 1996, p. 1)
       Socrates of Athens famously declared that "the unexamined life is not worth living," and his motto aptly explains the impulse to philosophize. Taking nothing for granted, philosophy probes and questions the fundamental presuppositions of every area of human inquiry.... [P]art of the job of the philosopher is to keep at a certain critical distance from current doctrines, whether in the sciences or the arts, and to examine instead how the various elements in our world-view clash, or fit together. Some philosophers have tried to incorporate the results of these inquiries into a grand synoptic view of the nature of reality and our human relationship to it. Others have mistrusted system-building, and seen their primary role as one of clarifications, or the removal of obstacles along the road to truth. But all have shared the Socratic vision of using the human intellect to challenge comfortable preconceptions, insisting that every aspect of human theory and practice be subjected to continuing critical scrutiny....
       Philosophy is, of course, part of a continuing tradition, and there is much to be gained from seeing how that tradition originated and developed. But the principal object of studying the materials in this book is not to pay homage to past genius, but to enrich one's understanding of central problems that are as pressing today as they have always been-problems about knowledge, truth and reality, the nature of the mind, the basis of right action, and the best way to live. These questions help to mark out the territory of philosophy as an academic discipline, but in a wider sense they define the human predicament itself; they will surely continue to be with us for as long as humanity endures. (Cottingham, 1996, pp. xxi-xxii)
       In his study of ancient Greek culture, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche drew what would become a famous distinction, between the Dionysian spirit, the untamed spirit of art and creativity, and the Apollonian, that of reason and self-control. The story of Greek civilization, and all civilizations, Nietzsche implied, was the gradual victory of Apollonian man, with his desire for control over nature and himself, over Dionysian man, who survives only in myth, poetry, music, and drama. Socrates and Plato had attacked the illusions of art as unreal, and had overturned the delicate cultural balance by valuing only man's critical, rational, and controlling consciousness while denigrating his vital life instincts as irrational and base. The result of this division is "Alexandrian man," the civilized and accomplished Greek citizen of the later ancient world, who is "equipped with the greatest forces of knowledge" but in whom the wellsprings of creativity have dried up. (Herman, 1997, pp. 95-96)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Philosophy

  • 3 Computers

       The brain has been compared to a digital computer because the neuron, like a switch or valve, either does or does not complete a circuit. But at that point the similarity ends. The switch in the digital computer is constant in its effect, and its effect is large in proportion to the total output of the machine. The effect produced by the neuron varies with its recovery from [the] refractory phase and with its metabolic state. The number of neurons involved in any action runs into millions so that the influence of any one is negligible.... Any cell in the system can be dispensed with.... The brain is an analogical machine, not digital. Analysis of the integrative activities will probably have to be in statistical terms. (Lashley, quoted in Beach, Hebb, Morgan & Nissen, 1960, p. 539)
       It is essential to realize that a computer is not a mere "number cruncher," or supercalculating arithmetic machine, although this is how computers are commonly regarded by people having no familiarity with artificial intelligence. Computers do not crunch numbers; they manipulate symbols.... Digital computers originally developed with mathematical problems in mind, are in fact general purpose symbol manipulating machines....
       The terms "computer" and "computation" are themselves unfortunate, in view of their misleading arithmetical connotations. The definition of artificial intelligence previously cited-"the study of intelligence as computation"-does not imply that intelligence is really counting. Intelligence may be defined as the ability creatively to manipulate symbols, or process information, given the requirements of the task in hand. (Boden, 1981, pp. 15, 16-17)
       The task is to get computers to explain things to themselves, to ask questions about their experiences so as to cause those explanations to be forthcoming, and to be creative in coming up with explanations that have not been previously available. (Schank, 1986, p. 19)
       In What Computers Can't Do, written in 1969 (2nd edition, 1972), the main objection to AI was the impossibility of using rules to select only those facts about the real world that were relevant in a given situation. The "Introduction" to the paperback edition of the book, published by Harper & Row in 1979, pointed out further that no one had the slightest idea how to represent the common sense understanding possessed even by a four-year-old. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 102)
       A popular myth says that the invention of the computer diminishes our sense of ourselves, because it shows that rational thought is not special to human beings, but can be carried on by a mere machine. It is a short stop from there to the conclusion that intelligence is mechanical, which many people find to be an affront to all that is most precious and singular about their humanness.
       In fact, the computer, early in its career, was not an instrument of the philistines, but a humanizing influence. It helped to revive an idea that had fallen into disrepute: the idea that the mind is real, that it has an inner structure and a complex organization, and can be understood in scientific terms. For some three decades, until the 1940s, American psychology had lain in the grip of the ice age of behaviorism, which was antimental through and through. During these years, extreme behaviorists banished the study of thought from their agenda. Mind and consciousness, thinking, imagining, planning, solving problems, were dismissed as worthless for anything except speculation. Only the external aspects of behavior, the surface manifestations, were grist for the scientist's mill, because only they could be observed and measured....
       It is one of the surprising gifts of the computer in the history of ideas that it played a part in giving back to psychology what it had lost, which was nothing less than the mind itself. In particular, there was a revival of interest in how the mind represents the world internally to itself, by means of knowledge structures such as ideas, symbols, images, and inner narratives, all of which had been consigned to the realm of mysticism. (Campbell, 1989, p. 10)
       [Our artifacts] only have meaning because we give it to them; their intentionality, like that of smoke signals and writing, is essentially borrowed, hence derivative. To put it bluntly: computers themselves don't mean anything by their tokens (any more than books do)-they only mean what we say they do. Genuine understanding, on the other hand, is intentional "in its own right" and not derivatively from something else. (Haugeland, 1981a, pp. 32-33)
       he debate over the possibility of computer thought will never be won or lost; it will simply cease to be of interest, like the previous debate over man as a clockwork mechanism. (Bolter, 1984, p. 190)
       t takes us a long time to emotionally digest a new idea. The computer is too big a step, and too recently made, for us to quickly recover our balance and gauge its potential. It's an enormous accelerator, perhaps the greatest one since the plow, twelve thousand years ago. As an intelligence amplifier, it speeds up everything-including itself-and it continually improves because its heart is information or, more plainly, ideas. We can no more calculate its consequences than Babbage could have foreseen antibiotics, the Pill, or space stations.
       Further, the effects of those ideas are rapidly compounding, because a computer design is itself just a set of ideas. As we get better at manipulating ideas by building ever better computers, we get better at building even better computers-it's an ever-escalating upward spiral. The early nineteenth century, when the computer's story began, is already so far back that it may as well be the Stone Age. (Rawlins, 1997, p. 19)
       According to weak AI, the principle value of the computer in the study of the mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool. For example, it enables us to formulate and test hypotheses in a more rigorous and precise fashion than before. But according to strong AI the computer is not merely a tool in the study of the mind; rather the appropriately programmed computer really is a mind in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states. And according to strong AI, because the programmed computer has cognitive states, the programs are not mere tools that enable us to test psychological explanations; rather, the programs are themselves the explanations. (Searle, 1981b, p. 353)
       What makes people smarter than machines? They certainly are not quicker or more precise. Yet people are far better at perceiving objects in natural scenes and noting their relations, at understanding language and retrieving contextually appropriate information from memory, at making plans and carrying out contextually appropriate actions, and at a wide range of other natural cognitive tasks. People are also far better at learning to do these things more accurately and fluently through processing experience.
       What is the basis for these differences? One answer, perhaps the classic one we might expect from artificial intelligence, is "software." If we only had the right computer program, the argument goes, we might be able to capture the fluidity and adaptability of human information processing. Certainly this answer is partially correct. There have been great breakthroughs in our understanding of cognition as a result of the development of expressive high-level computer languages and powerful algorithms. However, we do not think that software is the whole story.
       In our view, people are smarter than today's computers because the brain employs a basic computational architecture that is more suited to deal with a central aspect of the natural information processing tasks that people are so good at.... hese tasks generally require the simultaneous consideration of many pieces of information or constraints. Each constraint may be imperfectly specified and ambiguous, yet each can play a potentially decisive role in determining the outcome of processing. (McClelland, Rumelhart & Hinton, 1986, pp. 3-4)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Computers

  • 4 avance

    m.
    1 advance.
    avances científicos scientific advances
    2 advance payment (finance).
    3 preview (radio & television).
    4 advancement, breakthrough, development, headway.
    5 progress, advance, forward movement.
    pres.subj.
    1st person singular (yo) Present Subjunctive of Spanish verb: avanzar.
    * * *
    1 (acción) advance
    2 (pago) advance payment; (balance) balancing; (presupuesto) estimate
    3 (de película) trailer
    \
    avance informativo TELEVISIÓN news preview, US news brief
    * * *
    noun m.
    * * *
    SM
    1) (=movimiento) advance
    2) (=progreso) advance
    3) (Econ) advance (payment)
    4) (Cine) (=tráiler) trailer

    un avance de la programación matinal — (TV) a look ahead at the morning's programmes

    avance informativo — news headlines, advance news summary

    5) (Com) (=balance) balance; (=cálculo) estimate
    6) (Elec) lead
    7) (Mec) feed
    8) Cono Sur (=ataque) attack, raid
    9) Cono Sur (=regalo) tempting offer, inducement ( made to secure sb's goodwill)
    10) CAm (=robo) theft
    * * *
    1)
    a) ( adelanto) advance
    b) ( movimiento) advance; (Mil) advance; (Dep) move forward
    2)
    a) (Esp) (Cin, TV) trailer
    b) avances masculino plural (Méx) (Cin, TV) trailer
    •
    * * *
    1)
    a) ( adelanto) advance
    b) ( movimiento) advance; (Mil) advance; (Dep) move forward
    2)
    a) (Esp) (Cin, TV) trailer
    b) avances masculino plural (Méx) (Cin, TV) trailer
    •
    * * *
    avance1
    1 = move, progress, push towards, progression, march.

    Ex: Better flexibility is achieved if the heating, ventilation and lighting can accommodate this move without the need for any alterations.

    Ex: AACR represented a significant element in the progress towards rational and standard cataloguing practices.
    Ex: In the frenetic push towards international cooperation among research libraries, the library needs of the nonscholar are easily overlooked.
    Ex: In the past few years, there has been a technological progression from the Internet to intranets and, now, to extranets.
    Ex: The march of information technology has changed service presentation but the media which are used today are those which have served public librarians for years.
    * avance inexorable = relentlessness.
    * avance rápido de imágenes = fast motion.
    * AvPág (Avance Página) = PgDn (Page Down).
    * coartar el avance de Algo = hinder + progress.
    * evaluación del avance realizado = progress evaluation.
    * hacer avances = make + headway.
    * informe sobre el avance de un proyecto = progress report.
    * retrasar el avance = retard + progress.
    * ser un gran avance = be half the battle.
    * símbolo de avance de línea = line feed character.
    * tecla de Avance de Página = Page Down key.

    avance2
    2 = advance, advancement, breakthrough [break-through], development, enhancement, stride, betterment, step forward, furtherance, step up.

    Ex: I think that the most important advance that we can look forward to is a great increase in the amount of authority data in MARC form.

    Ex: In order to achieve good consistent indexing the indexer must have a thorough appreciation of the structure of the subject and the nature of the contribution that the document makes to the advancement of knowledge.
    Ex: With the exception of a few prescient observers, most predictions of the 20th century overlooked such breakthroughs as the computer.
    Ex: Enumerative schemes can be difficult to revise to take account of new developments.
    Ex: Editors consider content of abstracts and their languages as a primary factor in retrieval enhancement.
    Ex: Recent strides in storage technology portend lower cost and greater capacity systems for all computers.
    Ex: The new danger is that new technologies will be used for the betterment of only a small part of the world's population.
    Ex: This article represents a step forward in attempting to systematize the redefinition of library purpose, not simply by basing purpose on community needs but by 'linking needs and libraries in a coherent way'.
    Ex: The aims of the centre are the furtherance of teaching and research on any aspect of South Asia.
    Ex: In terms of intellectual evolution, it is a radical step up and great leap forward for mankind.
    * avance de la medicina = medical advance.
    * avance espectacular = quantum leap.
    * avance importantísimo = giant leap, great leap forward.
    * avance médico = medical advance.
    * avance profesional = career progression, rise through the ranks.
    * avance técnico = technical advance.
    * avance tecnológico = technological advancement.
    * con avances = stepped-up.
    * con los últimos avances = state-of-the-art, leading edge.
    * mantenerse al día de los avances = track + developments.
    * mantenerse al tanto de los avances = track + developments.
    * nuevos avances = future development(s).
    * ser un avance = be a step forward.
    * suponer una avance sobre = move + one away from.
    * suponer un avance = be a step forward.

    avance3
    3 = trailer, sneak preview, sneak peek, movie trailer.

    Ex: A trailer is a short motion picture film consisting of selected scenes from a film to be shown at a future date, used to advertise that film.

    Ex: It includes 50 pages of listings of forthcoming spring books, as well as 11 pages of ' sneak previews' of children's books scheduled for autumn 1998 = Incluye 50 páginas de novedades editoriales para la primavera así como 11 páginas de " avances" de libros infantiles programados para otoño de 1998.
    Ex: This is a 'sneak peek' at new products that systems vendors will have on exhibit at the conference = Este es un " avance" de los nuevos productos que los vendedores de sistemas expondrán en el congreso.
    Ex: The movie trailer was promissory of action and adventure, but the film itself was a bore.

    avance4

    Ex: The mobile library was based on a converted pickup truck with a camper shell, plus a tent shelter, and camp lantern for night services.

    * * *
    A
    1 (adelanto) advance
    un gran avance en el campo de la medicina a great step forward o a breakthrough in the field of medicine
    no hubo avances significativos en las negociaciones no significant progress was made in the negotiations
    2 (movimiento) advance; ( Mil) advance; ( Dep) move forward
    la lucha contra el avance del desierto the struggle against the advancing o encroaching desert
    B
    1 ( Esp) ( Cin, TV) trailer
    un avance de la programación del fin de semana a preview of o a look ahead at this weekend's programs
    2 avances mpl ( Méx) ( Cin, TV) trailer
    Compuesto:
    news summary, news headlines (pl)
    C ( Méx) ( Hist) (robo) pillage, looting; (botín) booty
    * * *

     

    Del verbo avanzar: ( conjugate avanzar)

    avancé es:

    1ª persona singular (yo) pretérito indicativo

    avance es:

    1ª persona singular (yo) presente subjuntivo

    3ª persona singular (él/ella/usted) presente subjuntivo

    3ª persona singular (él/ella/usted) imperativo

    Multiple Entries:
    avance    
    avanzar
    avance sustantivo masculino

    ◊ un avance en este campo an advance o a step forward in this field


    (Mil) advance;
    (Dep) move forward
    avanzar ( conjugate avanzar) verbo intransitivo
    a) [persona/tráfico] to advance, move forward

    b) [ciencia/medicina] to advance

    c) [cinta/rollo] to wind on

    d) [ persona] (en los estudios, el trabajo) to make progress;

    [negociaciones/proyecto] to progress

    verbo transitivo

    b) ( mover) to move … forward, advance

    avance sustantivo masculino
    1 advance
    2 Rad TV avance informativo, news summary, preview of news headlines
    avanzar verbo transitivo to advance, make progress
    ' avance' also found in these entries:
    Spanish:
    av pág
    - tráiler
    - adelanto
    - implacable
    - paso
    English:
    advance
    - advancement
    - breakthrough
    - development
    - progress
    - trailer
    - wave on
    - break
    - drag
    - flash
    - hail
    - march
    - preview
    * * *
    ♦ nm
    1. [movimiento hacia delante] advance;
    el avance a través de la selva fue dificultoso making progress through the jungle was not easy
    Informát avance de línea [de impresora] line feed; Informát avance de página [de impresora] form feed
    2. [adelanto, progreso] advance;
    avances científicos/tecnológicos scientific/technological advances o progress;
    los avances en la lucha contra el cáncer advances in the fight against cancer
    3. [anticipo de dinero] advance payment
    4. [de película] trailer
    5. Rad & TV [de futura programación] preview
    avance informativo [resumen] news summary; [por noticia de última hora] newsflash
    * * *
    m
    1 advance;
    avance de papel en impresora paper advance
    2 en cine trailer
    * * *
    avance nm
    adelanto: advance
    * * *
    1. (progreso) advance

    Spanish-English dictionary > avance

  • 5 Cognitive Science

       The basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense.... [P]eople and intelligent computers turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)
       2) Experimental Psychology, Theoretical Linguistics, and Computational Simulation of Cognitive Processes Are All Components of Cognitive Science
       I went away from the Symposium with a strong conviction, more intuitive than rational, that human experimental psychology, theoretical linguistics, and computer simulation of cognitive processes were all pieces of a larger whole, and that the future would see progressive elaboration and coordination of their shared concerns.... I have been working toward a cognitive science for about twenty years beginning before I knew what to call it. (G. A. Miller, 1979, p. 9)
        Cognitive Science studies the nature of cognition in human beings, other animals, and inanimate machines (if such a thing is possible). While computers are helpful within cognitive science, they are not essential to its being. A science of cognition could still be pursued even without these machines.
        Computer Science studies various kinds of problems and the use of computers to solve them, without concern for the means by which we humans might otherwise resolve them. There could be no computer science if there were no machines of this kind, because they are indispensable to its being. Artificial Intelligence is a special branch of computer science that investigates the extent to which the mental powers of human beings can be captured by means of machines.
       There could be cognitive science without artificial intelligence but there could be no artificial intelligence without cognitive science. One final caveat: In the case of an emerging new discipline such as cognitive science there is an almost irresistible temptation to identify the discipline itself (as a field of inquiry) with one of the theories that inspired it (such as the computational conception...). This, however, is a mistake. The field of inquiry (or "domain") stands to specific theories as questions stand to possible answers. The computational conception should properly be viewed as a research program in cognitive science, where "research programs" are answers that continue to attract followers. (Fetzer, 1996, pp. xvi-xvii)
       What is the nature of knowledge and how is this knowledge used? These questions lie at the core of both psychology and artificial intelligence.
       The psychologist who studies "knowledge systems" wants to know how concepts are structured in the human mind, how such concepts develop, and how they are used in understanding and behavior. The artificial intelligence researcher wants to know how to program a computer so that it can understand and interact with the outside world. The two orientations intersect when the psychologist and the computer scientist agree that the best way to approach the problem of building an intelligent machine is to emulate the human conceptual mechanisms that deal with language.... The name "cognitive science" has been used to refer to this convergence of interests in psychology and artificial intelligence....
       This working partnership in "cognitive science" does not mean that psychologists and computer scientists are developing a single comprehensive theory in which people are no different from machines. Psychology and artificial intelligence have many points of difference in methods and goals.... We simply want to work on an important area of overlapping interest, namely a theory of knowledge systems. As it turns out, this overlap is substantial. For both people and machines, each in their own way, there is a serious problem in common of making sense out of what they hear, see, or are told about the world. The conceptual apparatus necessary to perform even a partial feat of understanding is formidable and fascinating. (Schank & Abelson, 1977, pp. 1-2)
       Within the last dozen years a general change in scientific outlook has occurred, consonant with the point of view represented here. One can date the change roughly from 1956: in psychology, by the appearance of Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin's Study of Thinking and George Miller's "The Magical Number Seven"; in linguistics, by Noam Chomsky's "Three Models of Language"; and in computer science, by our own paper on the Logic Theory Machine. (Newell & Simon, 1972, p. 4)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Cognitive Science

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